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NOTE

Abbott v. Abbott: An Overly Broad Conclusion as to
Whether Ne Exeat Provisions Create Rights of
Custody Under the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction
EVE PACHTER†

In Abbott v. Abbott,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether a non-custodial father‘s ne exeat right,2 granted
by the Chilean family court, constituted a ―right of custody,‖ as
defined under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (Hague Convention).3 The Court
ultimately held that the father‘s ne exeat right amounted to a ―right of
custody.‖4 Therefore, the mother‘s wrongful removal of the son
violated the Hague Convention,5 allowing the father to seek the
treaty‘s right of return remedy.6 Furthermore, the Court held that ne
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1. 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
2. A ne exeat writ restrains a person from leaving a court‘s jurisdiction. BLACK‘S LAW
DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004). A ne exeat writ is often used to prohibit a person from
removing a child or property from the jurisdiction. Id.
3. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987. The Convention defines ―rights of custody‖ to ―include
rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine
the child‘s place of residence.‖ Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction art. 5(a), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
4. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993.
5. See id. at 1990.
6. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 12 (requiring the judicial or administrative
authority of a state party to order the return of a child abducted in violation of a parent‘s
rights of custody).
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exeat rights always constitute ―rights of custody‖ under the Hague
Convention.7
Although the Court purported to render a judgment that aligned
with the underlying objectives of the Hague Convention, the majority
opinion improperly generalized the question presented8 and failed to
consider the varying contexts in which international courts have
applied ne exeat rights.9 By doing so, the Court reached a conclusion
that is overly broad and runs counter to the objectives of the Hague
Convention.10
I.

THE CASE

Petitioner, Timothy Abbott, and respondent, Jacquelyn Abbott,
married in 1992.11 The couple‘s son, A.J.A. was born in Hawaii in
1995.12 In 2002, the Abbotts moved to La Serena, Chile.13
Subsequently, the couple separated in March of 2003, and sought
child custody arrangements in the Chilean family court.14 The court
granted Ms. Abbott with sole custody rights of A.J.A and awarded
Mr. Abbott specific ―direct‖ and ―regular‖ visitation rights.15
Under Chilean law, once a parent is granted visitation rights, a
ne exeat right automatically follows.16 Yet, even with this statutory
provision in place, Ms. Abbott sought an additional ne exeat order
from the court.17 On January 13, 2004, the court granted Ms.

7. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993, 1995.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part IV.C.
11. Abbott v. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d 542 F.3d 1081
(5th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The district court noted that, ―careful review of the record reveals that the Chilean
family court granted all care and custody rights to Ms. Abbott, despite Mr. Abbott‘s petitions
to the courts for custody of his son.‖ Id. at 637 n.2.
16. James D. Garbolino, The United States Supreme Court Settles the Ne Exeat
Controversy in America: Abbott v. Abbott, 59 INT‘L & COMP. L. QUART. 1158, 1159 (2010)
(citing Minors Law 16, 618, art. 49 (Chile)). The Chilean Minors Law prohibits a parent
from permanently removing a child from Chile without the consent of the parent with
visitation rights. Id.
17. Id.
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Abbott‘s request, prohibiting either parent from removing the child
from Chile without their mutual consent.18
In August of 2005, Ms. Abbott removed A.J.A. from Chile
without the permission of Mr. Abbott or the Chilean Family Court,
while custody proceedings before the court were still pending. 19 Ms.
Abbott and A.J.A. were eventually located in Texas where Mr.
Abbott filed an action claiming that A.J.A. was wrongfully removed
from Chile in violation of the Hague Convention.20
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas denied Mr. Abbott the return remedy that he sought under the
Hague Convention.21 In doing so, the court held that Mr. Abbott‘s ne
exeat right did not constitute a right of custody under the Hague
Convention and, therefore, Ms. Abbott‘s removal of A.J.A. from
Chile was not ―wrongful‖ as defined by the treaty. 22 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower
court‘s decision, also focusing on the Hague Convention‘s clear
distinction between rights of access and rights of custody.23
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Overview of the Convention

The issue of international child abduction did not garner
significant attention from the international community until the late
1970s when international travel became more frequent and,
consequently, the number of international marriages increased.24 This
18. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 641.
22. Id. (―The Hague Convention explicitly creates a different set of remedies for those
parents whose rights of access are frustrated by the custodial parent‘s removal of a child
from the child‘s country of habitual residence‖). Compare Hague Convention, supra note 3,
art. 5(a) (defining ―rights of custody‖ to include ―the right to determine the child‘s place of
residence) with id. art. 5(b) (defining ―rights of access,‖ to include the ―right to take a child
for a limited period of time to place other than the child‘s habitual residence‖).
23. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1088 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
―Mr. Abbott‘s rights of access, however enhanced and protected by the ne exeat order, is
simply not sufficient to create rights of custody that warrant the greater protection intended
under the Hague Convention.‖ Id. at 1087.
24. Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in
International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
3325, 3330–31 (2009).
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development, in conjunction with the rising rate of divorces and
separations, resulted in a noticeable increase in international child
custody disputes.25 In attempting to handle cases of this nature, a
number of problems became evident such as locating the child, the
high costs associated with international disputes, and the
unwillingness of foreign and local authorities to provide assistance.26
Complications were further compounded by the fact that some
courts adjudicating international child abduction cases applied the
best-interests-of-the-child standard.27 This amorphous and
individualized standard resulted in unpredictable outcomes,28 which
were, at times, influenced by the particular country‘s societal mores
regarding child rearing.29 Those courts that chose to utilize a different
mode of analysis still posed problems for parents involved in
international child abduction disputes, since many of these courts
exhibited a gender bias.30 Moreover, the left-behind parent was
typically obligated to seek a judicial remedy in the country in which
the abducted child was located.31 Often the laws of this country
differed from the laws of the left-behind parent‘s own country.32 The
resulting phenomenon included inconsistent and non-uniform
judgments handed down by international courts.33 Furthermore, the
situation provided a perverse incentive for parents to remove a child
to another country in order to obtain a more favorable legal custody
judgment than they would have received in their own country.34
In March of 1979, a Special Commission was convened to
examine these problems relating to international child abduction.35
The Hague Convention was adopted by a unanimous vote on October

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 3331.
Id.
Id. at 3332.
Id.
Id. (citing Paul R. Beumont & Peter E. McEleavy, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 2 (1999)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 3333.
34. See id. at 3336 (―[T]he Child Abduction Convention discourages parents from
unilaterally removing their children in order to use them as instruments to obtain a
convenient and favorable forum in which to air their custody disputes.‖).
35. Thompson v. Thompson, [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513, 531 (S.C.C.) (Can.).
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25, 1980.36 Its stated purpose is ―to protect children internationally
from the harmful effects of their removal or retention and to establish
procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual
residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access.‖37 Thus,
the framers of the Hague Convention intended to deter the practice of
international child abductions.38
The Hague Convention mandates that a child‘s return occur
when a ―wrongful removal‖ or retention is found.39 According to the
Hague Convention, a ―wrongful removal‖ occurs where:
a) [I]t is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a
person, institution or another body, either jointly or
alone, under the law of the State in which the child was
habitually resident immediately before the removal or
retention; and
b) At the time of removal or retention those rights were
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would
have been so exercised but for the removal or
retention.40
The Hague Convention further defines ―rights of custody‖ to
―include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in
particular, the right to determine the child‘s place of residence.‖41 On
the other hand, rights of access, which, if violated, do not constitute a
wrongful removal under the Hague Convention, include the ―right to

36. Vivatvaraphol, supra note 24, at 3334. The United States became a signatory to the
Hague Convention on December 23, 1981. Id. at 3339. On April 29, 1988, the United States
implemented the Hague Convention when Congress enacted International Child Abduction
Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
11601–11 (2006)). The act requires that in any action brought under the Hague Convention
for the return of a child, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the child has been wrongfully removed or retained. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e) (2006).
37. Hague Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
38. Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need
for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 289 (2002).
39. Hague Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 12.
40. Id. art. 3.
41. Id. art. 5(a).
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take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the
child‘s habitual residence.‖42
Importantly, the Hague Convention does not address, nor does it
seek to address, which party is legally entitled to custody of the
abducted child.43 Rather, the Hague Convention solely addresses in
what jurisdiction the custody dispute should be adjudicated.44 For this
reason, courts deciding a case under the Hague Convention may only
consider the claim of wrongful removal and not the merits of the
underlying case.45
While the historical problems leading to the Hague Convention‘s
ratification are clear, the context in which remedies under the Hague
Convention are now being sought have significantly changed since
the Hague Convention‘s initial ratification.46 In particular, many of
the recent U.S. cases decided pursuant to the Hague Convention
involved situations of domestic violence.47 These cases typically
entail a mother who is the primary caretaker abducting the child and
alleging she was a victim of domestic violence.48
Significantly, the Hague Convention was not drafted with such
scenarios in mind.49 The Hague Convention was originally
introduced ―to discourage abductions by parents who had lost, or
would lose, a custody contest‖ from removing their children to other
countries in the hope of obtaining a more favorable judgment.50
Therefore, ―the abductor was not traditionally thought to be the
42. Id. art. 5(b). ―[T]he Convention leaves the enforcement of access rights to the
administrative channels of Central Authorities designated by the state parties to the
Convention.‖ Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513, 533 (Can.).
43. Vivatvaraphol, supra note 24, at 3335.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Weiner, supra note 37, at 278–80.
47. Id. at 277 (―Seven of the nine cases decided by the United States courts of appeals
between July 2000 and January 2001 involved an abductor who alleged that she was a victim
of domestic violence.‖).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 278. Although the context in which the Hague Convention is now being
applied has shifted, the treaty does contain a provision maintaining that:
the judicial or administrative authority of the requested state is not bound to order
the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its
return establishes that there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation.‖
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(b).
50. Weiner, supra note 37, at 278.
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primary caretaker.‖51 This contextual shift has, in effect, required that
the Hague Convention operate in the inverse function of the
originally intended applicable scenario.52 Although this contextual
modification may appear minor, the variation has impacted many
courts charged with the task of interpreting the Convention.53
Specifically, ―while the return remedy works well if the abductor is a
non-custodial parent, it is inappropriate when the abductor is a
primary caretaker who is seeking to protect herself and the child from
the other parent‘s violence.‖54
III. U.S. CASE LAW EXAMINING WHETHER A NE EXEAT RIGHT
CONSTITUTES A RIGHT OF CUSTODY UNDER THE CONVENTION
Abbott v. Abbott was the first United States Supreme Court case
to interpret the Hague Convention since the underlying issue is a
family law dispute, an area of law traditionally reserved for state
courts.55 Moreover, United States Circuit Courts were equally divided
on the issue of whether a ne exeat provision constituted a right of
custody under the Hague Convention.56 Therefore, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in an attempt to resolve the circuit court split
on the issue.57
Four federal circuit courts, other than the circuit court in Abbott,
have ruled on the issue of whether a ne exeat right creates a right of
custody under the Hague Convention.58 In Croll v. Croll,59 the
Second Circuit held that a ne exeat right ―does not transmute access
rights into rights of custody under the Convention.‖60 A family court
in Hong Kong had granted Mrs. Croll with ―sole custody, care, and
51. Id.
52. See id. at 278–79.
53. Id. at 279 (―In some of the recent decisions, courts have adopted novel legal
interpretations in an effort to avoid applying the Convention to these abductors.‖).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 282.
56. See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
57. Martha Bailey, Abbott v. Abbott: Do Ne Exeat Provisions Create Rights of
Custody?, 29 CAN. FAM L.Q. 171, 177 (2010).
58. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2004); Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d
491 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010); Gonzalez v.
Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983
(2010); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S.
Ct. 1983 (2010).
59. 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
60. Id. at 143.
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control‖ of the child and granted the father a right of ―reasonable
access.‖61 Based on these facts, the Second Circuit denied Mr. Croll‘s
request for his daughter‘s return to Hong Kong, finding that Mr.
Croll‘s rights, even including the ne exeat clause, did not include the
powers of a custodial parent.62
The Ninth Circuit held similarly in Gonzalez v. Gutierrez63 when
it concluded that ―a ne exeat right serves only to allow a parent with
access rights to impose a limitation on the custodial parent‘s right to
expatriate the child.‖64 In Gonzalez, Rosa Teresa Gutierrez and
Eduardo Arce Gonzalez sought to obtain a divorce in Mexico.65
Gutierrez alleged that Eduardo repeatedly physically and verbally
abused her during their marriage.66 In August 2000, the divorce was
granted. According to the divorce agreement, Gutierrez and Arce‘s
minor children were to ―remain under the sole custody and care of
their mother.‖67 Arce, on the other hand, was granted visitation
rights.68 The divorce agreement also stipulated that Arce ―must grant
full authorization . . . on every occasion that his minor children . . .
seek to leave the country.‖69
In holding that the ne exeat clause in the custody agreement
failed to constitute a right of custody under the Hague Convention,
the court focused on the fact that the explicit terms of the divorce
agreement, which was approved by the Mexican family court,
granted sole custody to Ms. Gutierrez.70 The court also determined
that Arce‘s ability to deny permission for his children to leave
Mexico did not amount to a right of custody because Arce could not
determine, with any specificity, where the children would reside
within Mexico or even outside of Mexico.71

61. Id. at 135.
62. Id. at 143–44. ―The right granted under a ne exeat clause is, at most, a veto power.‖
Id. at 140.
63. 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983
(2010).
64. Id. at 949.
65. Id. at 946.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 947.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 950.
71. Id. at 949.
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Although examining the issue in a slightly different context, the
Fourth Circuit in Fawcett v. McRoberts echoed the conclusions in
Croll and Gonzalez, holding that a ne exeat right does not constitute a
right of custody under the Hague Convention.72 In Fawcett, the
parties had married in Scotland in 1986.73 While married, the couple
had two children, although custody regarding only one of the children
was in dispute.74 In 1998, a Scottish Court issued a divorce decree
requiring that the child live with Mr. McRoberts and providing
visitation rights to Ms. Fawcett.75 Ms. Fawcett became increasingly
concerned that Mr. McRoberts might take their son to the United
States.76 Therefore, she sought an order from the court preventing
Mr. McRoberts from removing the child from Scotland, which the
court granted.77
Like in Gonzalez, the court‘s holding in Fawcett also rested upon
an examination of the actual language in the couple‘s divorce decree.
Specifically, the ―Residence Order‖ in the decree gave ―Mr.
McRoberts the exclusive power to determine [the child‘s]
residence.‖78 The court also found the reasoning of the courts in
Gonzalez and Croll to be sufficiently persuasive.79
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion in Furnes v. Reeves80 when it held that a non-custodial
parent‘s ne exeat right does establish a right of custody.81 The court
based much of its decision on the fact that the Hague Convention
does not specifically define the phrase ―place of residence.‖82
Therefore, a parent‘s ne exeat right to determine whether the child
lives inside or outside the state can conceivably constitute the right to
determine a child‘s place of residence.83 Based on this interpretation,
72. Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Abbott v.
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010) (holding that Scottish family law that permits non-custodial
parents to maintain relations and direct contact with the child did not create rights of custody
under the Hague Convention).
73. Id. at 492.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 493.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 499.
79. Id. at 500.
80. 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2004).
81. Id. at 716.
82. Id. at 715–16.
83. See id. at 715.
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the court concluded that the parent did have ―rights of custody‖ in
accordance with the Hague Convention.84
B.

Foreign Case Law Examining Whether a Ne Exeat Right
Constitutes a Right of Custody Under the Convention

Despite the lack of United States Supreme Court precedent
involving the Hague Convention, many high courts in foreign
countries have previously interpreted the treaty.85 Moreover, a
number of these courts have been faced with the specific issue of
whether a ne exeat provision constitutes a ―right of custody‖ under
the Hague Convention.86
Canada was one of the first countries ratify the Hague
Convention.87 For this reason, the Supreme Court of Canada‘s
opinions were persuasive value for many other signatory countries to
the treaty.88 In Thomson v. Thomson,89 the Supreme Court of Canada
was required to examine the effect of an interim custody order
prohibiting the mother from removing her child from Scotland.90 The
parties in Thomson were involved in a custody dispute in Scotland.91
A report produced during the dispute indicated that the mother was
the more suitable parent.92 Consequently, the Sheriff granted the
mother interim custody of the child and granted the father with
interim access to the child.93 The Sheriff also ordered that the child
―remain in Scotland pending a further court order.‖ 94 Despite the
order, the mother took the child to Manitoba where she filed a
petition seeking custody of the child.95

84. Id.
85. See infra notes 87–105 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 87–105 and accompanying text.
87. Martha Bailey, Canada’s Implementation of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 17, 17 (2000).
88. The case of Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513 (S.C.C.), in particular, is
referenced by numerous U.S. courts determining whether a ne exeat provision confers a right
of custody under the Child Abduction Convention. E.g., Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 143
(2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott.
89. [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513 (S.C.C.).
90. Id. at 518.
91. Id. at 519.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Scottish Court inserted the non-removal clause in the interim custody order
to preserve its jurisdiction to decide the issue of custody on its merits later. Id. at 514.
95. Id. at 519.
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As in many of the cases involving the Hague Convention, the
Supreme Court of Canada was required to determine whether the
removal of Matthew from Scotland constituted a breach of the
father‘s custody rights.96 Ultimately, the Court held that ―[t]he
appellant's removal of Matthew . . . constituted a breach of the
custody right of the Scottish court within the meaning of Article 3 of
the Hague Convention.‖97 In doing so, the Court recognized the
significance in Canadian law of a non-removal clause contained in an
interim custody order.98 The significance being that such a provision
is specifically included in order to preserve the court‘s jurisdiction to
determine the parent‘s final custody arrangement.99 Notably, in dicta,
the court stated that a ne exeat clause in a permanent custody order
may be construed differently than a non-removal clause in an interim
custody order.100
Other foreign courts have been forced to examine the issue of
whether ne exeat rights constitute rights of custody, although in
different contexts. In C. v. C.,101 the English Court of Appeals ruled
on a case involving a couple from Australia.102 Upon the couple‘s
separation, the deputy registrar of the Family Court in Sydney made a
consent order that gave the mother custody of the child, but kept both
parents as joint guardians.103 Clause two of the Consent Order
provided that neither party should remove the child from Australia
without the consent of the other.104 However, approximately two
years later, the mother took the child to England without obtaining
the father‘s consent.105

96. Id. at 536.
97. See id. at 540. ―[I]t seems clear that the non-removal clause was inserted into the
custody order of November 27, 1992 to preserve jurisdiction in the Scottish court to decide
the issue of custody on its merits in a full hearing at a later date.‖ Id.
98. Id. at 540.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 540–41. Justice La Forest elaborated:
It will be observed that I have underlined the purely interim nature of the mother‘s
custody in the present case. I would not wish to be understood as saying the
approach should be the same in a situation where a court inserts a non-removal
clause in a permanent order of custody. Such a clause raises quite different issues.
Id. at 540.
101. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654 (A.C.).
102. Id. at 656.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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The Court of Appeals found that under the Hague Convention
the father possessed a right of custody, which was breached by the
mother‘s wrongful removal of the child from Australia to England.106
Therefore, the court ordered the child‘s return to Australia in order to
allow the Australian court to decide with which parent the child
should live.107 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that ―the
father does not have the right to determine the child‘s place of
residence within Australia but has the right to ensure that the child
remains in Australia, or lives anywhere outside Australia only with
his approval.‖108 The court further determined that this right fell
within the purview of the Hague Convention‘s ―right of custody,‖
because ―the [Hague] Convention must be interpreted so that within
its scope it is to be effective.‖109
Other foreign courts have agreed with the English Court of
Appeals decision in C v. C. For example, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa in Sonderup v. Tondelli,110 held that a mother‘s removal
of her daughter from Canada, and retention in South Africa, was
wrongful under the Hague Convention.111 Sonderup involved a
couple that had married in South Africa, but subsequently filed for
divorce in Canada.112 The Supreme Court of British Columbia
granted a consent order, the terms of which provided that the mother
would have full custody of the child and the father have rights of
access.113 Moreover, the consent order provided that, ―neither the
plaintiff (the father) nor the defendant (the mother) shall remove the
child from the Province of British Columbia without further Court
order or the written agreement of the parties.‖114 Approximately a
year later, the father sought an urgent order from the court stipulating

106. Id. at 658.
107. Id. at 659–60.
108. Id. at 658.
109. Id.
110. 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC) (S. Afr.).
111. Id. at 1183.
112. Id. at 1177.
113. Id.
114. Id. The consent order also provided that neither parent would remove the child from
Canada without a court order or written agreement ―except that either party will be permitted
to travel outside of British Columbia with the child once per year for a period not to exceed
30 days.‖ Furthermore, ―[I]f the child is taken out of Canada for a period exceeding 30 days,
without further Court order or written consent of both parties . . . the child have been [sic]
wrongfully removed . . . in contravention of the [Hague] Convention . . . .‖ Id.
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that the mother refrain from removing the child from Canada.115
Despite this order, the mother removed the child from Canada to
South Africa, where they moved in with the mother‘s family.116
The Constitutional Court found that the mother wrongfully
removed the child in violation of the Hague Convention because the
parties had entered into an interim agreement stipulating that the
child would be returned to Canada on a specific date.117 Therefore,
the court was not ―dealing only with a non-removal provision in a
final custody agreement,‖ such as the agreement present before the
court in Croll.118 For these reasons, the Court ordered that the child
be returned to Canada.119
C. Summary of Court’s Reasoning
In Abbott v. Abbott, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the
Hague Convention for the first time.120 The question before the Court
was whether a non-custodial parent‘s ne exeat right conferred a ―right
of custody‖ within the meaning of the Hague Convention, thus
allowing Mr. Abbott to bring a cause of action against Ms. Abbott for
―wrongful removal of the child.‖121 Ultimately, the Court held that
Mr. Abbott‘s ne exeat right did, in fact, constitute a ―right of
custody‖ under the Hague Convention, and therefore, Ms. Abbott
―wrongfully removed‖ A.J.A. in violation of the treaty.122
In reaching its decision, the Court first examined the text of the
treaty.123 Specifically, the Court analyzed Article 5 of the Hague
Convention, which defines rights of custody as including rights
relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the
right to determine the child‘s place of residence.124 The underlying
question presented for the Court was under what context a parent

115. Id. at 1178. The order responding to the father‘s request stated that ―[t]he defendant
(the mother) be allowed to travel to South Africa with the child, for a one-month period . . .
returning July 14, 2000.‖ Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1182.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1191.
120. Garbolino, supra note 16, at 1158.
121. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987.
122. Id. at 1990.
123. Id. at 1989.
124. Id. (citing Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5).
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determines the child‘s place of residence.125 The Court concluded that
Mr. Abbott‘s ne exeat right conferred a right to determine A.J.A‘s
place of residence since Mr. Abbott‘s approval was needed before the
child was allowed to leave the country.126 In exercising this right, Mr.
Abbott jointly participated in deciding the country in which A.J.A.
must reside.127 Hence, a determination by Mr. Abbott that his son had
to reside in the country of Chile stood for a determination as to the
child‘s residence.128 More generally, the Court concluded that ―ne
exeat rights are rights of custody.‖129
In support of this conclusion, the Court offered the State
Department‘s Office of Children‘s Issues‘ interpretation that ne exeat
clauses confer rights of custody within the meaning of the Hague
Convention.130 The Court emphasized the role of the Executive
branch in this matter, explaining that the Executive has valuable
information and experience in treaty interpretation.131 For this reason,
the Court found it appropriate to defer to the Executive branch‘s
expertise when analyzing the particular issues presented by the case.
132

Next, the Court turned its attention to support from other
signatory countries to the Hague Convention.133 The Court justified
this analysis by noting that the ―Congress has directed that ‗uniform
international interpretation of the Convention‘ is part of its
framework.‖134 The Court then specified that other countries have
accepted the rule that ne exeat rights confer rights of custody within
the Hague Convention‘s meaning.135 The Court further noted that
there is even great scholarship and academic support on this position
125. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990–91. ―The phrase place of residence‖ encompasses the
child‘s country of residence, especially in light of the Convention‘s explicit purpose to
prevent wrongful removal across international borders.‖ Id.
126. Id. at 1990.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1991.
129. See id. at 1993. ―This Court‘s conclusion that ne exeat rights are rights of custody is
further informed by the views of other contracting states.‖ Id. ―A review of the international
case law confirms broad acceptance of the rule that ne exeat rights are rights of custody.‖ Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1993–94.
134. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B) (2006)).
135. Id. The Court specifically mentioned England, Israel, Austria, South Africa,
Germany and Scotland. Id.
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regarding whether ne exeat provisions can elicit the powerful return
remedy under the Hague Convention.136
Lastly, the Court focused on the Hague Convention‘s objectives
and concluded that its holding remained true to the treaty‘s objects
and purposes.137 In fact, the Court noted that denying the father‘s
request for the child‘s return under the Hague Convention ―would run
counter to the Convention‘s purpose of deterring child abductions by
parents who attempt to find a friendlier forum for deciding custodial
disputes.‖138 And, finally, the Court maintained that the Perez-Vera
Report139 supported the conclusion that the Hague Convention
contemplated ne exeat rights conferring rights of custody, by virtue
of the framers‘ intention that the term ―rights of custody‖ be
interpreted in a manner as expansive as possible.140
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, focused on defining the
true meaning of custody rights in addition to drawing a clear and
demarcated distinction between rights of custody and rights of
access.141 In particular, he emphasized the fact that the Hague
Convention provides for different remedies depending on which right
the abducting parent violates.142
The dissent also focused much of its opinion on the underlying
purpose of the Hague Convention by, in a similar manner to the
majority, carefully scrutinizing the treaty‘s text.143 The dissent began
by providing a historical context for the Hague Convention.144
Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that the drafters convened to
determine ―an international solution to an emerging problem:
transborder child abductions perpetrated by noncustodial parents to
establish artificial jurisdictional links . . . with a view to obtain

136. Id. at 1994.
137. Id. at 1995.
138. Id. at 1996.
139. The Perez-Vera Report contains the legislative history of the Convention. ELISA
PEREZ-VERA, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION
426 (1982), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter PEREZ-VERA
REPORT].
140. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1995 (citing PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 139, at 447–
48).
141. Id. at 1998 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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custody of the child.‖145 With this setting in mind, the dissent stated
that the Hague Convention‘s purpose was to ―protect children from
wrongful international removals or retention by persons bent on
obtaining their physical and/or legal custody.‖146 Based on this
purpose, the dissent articulated the change in context where the
custodial parent was removing the child from his country of habitual
residence—an instance not intended to be covered by the Hague
Convention.147 In light of this analysis, the dissent concluded that Mr.
Abbott‘s right to ―veto the other parent‘s decision to remove the child
from the country‖ did not amount to a right of custody as defined
under the Hague Convention.148
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court in Abbott v. Abbott improperly generalized the
question presented.149 In doing so, the Court reached an overly broad
conclusion that failed to take into account the varying contexts in
which ne exeat rights are applied.150 Ultimately, the Court‘s decision
does not comport with the objects and purposes of the Hague
Convention.151 The Court should have limited the scope of its
decision solely to whether Mr. Abbott‘s rights of custody, solely in
this case, were violated under the Hague Convention, rather than
holding that ne exeat rights always constitute ―rights of custody.‖152
A.

The Court Improperly Framed the Issue by Posing an Overly
General Question Presented

In Abbott, the Court inappropriately framed the issue by overgeneralizing the question presented. The Court initially posed the
question as ―whether a parent has a ‗right of custody‘ by reason of
that parent‘s ne exeat right: the authority to consent before the other
parent may take the child to another country?‖153 Thus, the Court
posed the question in a more universal, rather than case-specific,
manner.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. (citing PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 139, at 426) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1999.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.A.
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987.
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The Court later narrowed the issue when it stated: ―The question
is whether A.J.A. was ‗wrongfully removed‘ from Chile, in other
words, whether he was removed in violation of a right of custody?‖154
Yet, the Court ultimately concluded not only that ―Mr. Abbott
possesse[d] a right of custody under the Hague Convention,‖ but also
that ―ne exeat rights are rights of custody.‖155 Additionally, the Court
held that ―the joint right to decide a child‘s country of residence is
not even arguably a . . . visitation right.‖156 The Court, consequently,
did not merely render a decision as to whether Mr. Abbott‘s ne exeat
right constituted a ―right of custody‖ under the Hague Convention,
but declared that all ne exeat rights amount to a ―right of custody.‖
Courts in other countries faced with cases brought under the
Hague Convention have more appropriately narrowed the question
presented and, therefore, rendered a decision based on the specific
facts contained in the dispute. In Sonderup, for example, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa stated that the issues before the
Court were the following: ―1) whether the provisions of the
Convention apply in the present case; 2) if so, whether, as
incorporated by the Act, they are consistent with the Constitution,
and; 3) whether these provisions require the return of [the child].‖157
Similarly, in C v. C, the Court of Appeal stated that the specific
question is ―whether under Australian law clause 2 was capable of
constituting a right of custody within the Convention.‖158 Finally, in
Thomson, the Court articulated the principal question as whether ―the
child should be returned to Scotland under the terms of the
Convention.‖159
By posing the question presented in such a universal manner, the
Court in Abbott failed to properly narrow its analysis to the facts
specific to the case at hand. As a result, the Court engaged in a
general analysis of whether ne exeat rights constitute rights of
custody under the Hague Convention rather than appropriately
analyzing whether Mr. Abbott‘s rights, alone, constituted rights of
custody under the Hague Convention.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 1990.
Id. at 1993.
Id. at 1992.
2001 (1) SA 1171, 1181 (CC). (S. Afr.).
[1989] 1 W.L.R. 654, 657–58 (A.C.).
[1994] 10 W.W.R. 513, 518 (Can.).

Eve macro

372

B.

5/22/2012 10:17 AM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:355

Foreign Courts Have Applied Ne Exeat Rights in Various
Contexts

By examining the issue generally, the Court failed to take into
account the differing contexts in which ne exeat provisions can be
applied. Even a superficial examination of the cases referenced in the
Abbott decision indicates that ne exeat rights are utilized by foreign
courts in a variety of circumstances. For example, in the leading case
of Thomson, the Supreme Court of Canada examined an interim
custody order, which specified non-removal of the child from
Scotland pending a further court order.160 As previously noted, under
Canadian law, this non-removal provision has the effect of preserving
the court‘s jurisdiction to determine the final custody arrangement.161
The Supreme Court of Canada explained that it was forced to
compare the non-removal provision to Canadian law because no
evidence was put forth regarding the legal effect of this provision
under Scottish law.162
On the other hand, in Sonderup, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa examined a final custody order as well as an interim
agreement.163 Specifically, the Court noted that ―[h]ere, we are not
dealing only with a non-removal provision in a final custody
agreement . . . [i]n this case we have an interim agreement between
the parties that [the child] would be returned to her country of
habitual residence by a particular date.‖164
Finally, in C v. C, the Court of Appeal in England examined a
final consent order.165 Specifically, the order stipulated that:
(1) The mother . . . have custody of . . . the child of the
marriage and [that both] the [father] and the [mother]
. . . remain joint guardians of the said child. (2)
[Neither] the [father] nor the [mother] shall remove the
child from Australia without the consent of the
other.166

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 540.
Id.
Id.
2001 (1) SA 1171, 1177-78 (CC) (S. Afr.).
Id. at 1182.
See [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654, 657 (A.C.).
Id. at 656.
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Therefore, the situation in C v. C differed markedly from the cases of
Thomson and Sonderup in that the final consent order explicitly
stated that the parents were to remain joint guardians of the child.
These courts have even noted the varying contexts in which ne
exeat rights are applied. In particular, the South African
Constitutional Court in Sonderup stated that, ―[i]t has been held by
courts in several jurisdictions that such a non-removal provision can,
depending on the circumstances, confer a right of custody within the
meaning of the Convention.‖167 The Canadian Supreme Court in
Thomson further clarified what these differing circumstances may
entail when it emphasized ―the purely interim nature of the mother‘s
custody in the present case,‖168 and explained that the Court‘s
approach would differ if the facts involved a non-removal clause in a
permanent custody order.169 The Court clarified the distinction
further by stipulating that a non-removal clause in a permanent
custody order ―is usually intended to ensure permanent access to the
non-custodial parent,‖ but ―not intended to be given the same level of
protection by the Convention as custody.‖170
The Court in Abbott failed to truly consider the varying contexts
in which ne exeat rights may be applied. However, the Court briefly
referenced this reality when it noted that ―[t]his Court need not
decide the status of ne exeat orders lacking parent consent
provisions.‖171 Although it seems that the Court accepted that ne
exeat rights might be included in custody dispute orders for a variety
of different reasons, the Court failed to take this fact into account and
instead broadly concluded that ne exeat rights always constitute
rights of custody under the Hague Convention.

167. 2001 (1) SA at 1182 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
168. [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513, 540 (Can.).
169. Id. at 540–41.
170. Id. ―I agree that the insertion of a non-removal clause in a permanent order of
custody does not result in a right of custody being retained by the court and therefore does
not result in a wrongful removal, as defined in the Convention, in circumstances where the
custodial parent moves with the child to a new jurisdiction.‖ Id. at 553.
171. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1992.
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C. The Interpretation of Ne Exeat Rights Requires a Context
Specific Analysis in All Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court in Abbott, along with other high courts
in other countries,172 stressed the importance of uniformly
interpreting whether ne exeat rights constitute rights of custody under
the Hague Convention.173 This emphasis on uniformity is not
unwarranted, as there is a recognized notion that ―uniformity of
interpretation is inherent in the design of treaties.‖174 The necessity
for judicial uniformity in treaty interpretation naturally follows from
the fact that a treaty is founded upon ―a single, uniform content
shaped by the mutual design of the treaty parties.‖175
In an effort to facilitate uniformity in treaty interpretation, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention)
prescribes methods for treaty construction.176 Specifically, the Vienna
Convention states that ―[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖177 It
also provides that in determining the context for the purpose of
interpretation of a treaty, certain other documents may also be
considered.178
Based on these foundational principles of treaty interpretation, a
court must first look to the text of the Hague Convention to construe
the meaning of custody rights and access rights. The treaty‘s
definitions provide little clarity on the scope of these terms.179 In fact,
as the Court in Abbott noted, the Hague Convention specifically
failed to define custody in precise terms or refer to the laws of
172. E.g., In re Marriage of Resina [1991] FamCA 33, ¶ 22 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/family_ct/1991/33.html.
173. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1991 (―This uniform, text-based approach ensures international
consistency in interpreting the Convention.‖).
174. Michael Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call
for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L. J. 1885, 1937 (2005).
175. Id.
176. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
177. Id. art. 31.
178. Id. Such documents include:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
Id.
179. See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5.
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different nations pertaining to parental rights.180 Other important
terms, such as habitual residence, are not defined in the Hague
Convention at all.181 Therefore, the Hague Convention‘s text lacks
guidance, which has ―important implications for certain terms.‖182
Looking then to the objects and purpose of the Hague
Convention, Article 1 states that the Convention‘s objects are: ―a) to
secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or
retained in any Contracting State; and b) to ensure that rights of
custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively respected in the other Contracting States.‖183 To give
effect to these purposes, Article 7 of the Convention provides that
―[c]entral Authorities shall co-operate with each other and promote
co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their respective
States to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other
objects of this Convention.‖184 Article 21, which concerns rights of
access, also notes that, ―[t]he Central Authorities, either directly or
through intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the institution of
proceedings with a view to organizing or protecting these rights and
securing respect for the conditions to which the exercise of these
rights may be subject.‖185 The Perez-Vera Report further underlies
the Hague Convention‘s objectives of co-operation, stating that it ―is
above all a convention which seeks to prevent the international
removal of children by creating a system of close co-operation
among the judicial and administrative authorities of the Contracting
States.‖186
There is a common theme of co-operation and respect between
Contracting States. This notion does not lead to a conclusion that ne
exeat rights always constitute rights of custody. As previously
indicated, ne exeat rights have been granted by courts in different
contexts for a variety reasons. This explicit theme of respect and the
uncertainty about the scope of the rights of custody lends itself to the
conclusion that there need not be a general international acceptance
of whether ne exeat rights constitute rights of custody under the

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1995 (citing the Perez-Vera Report, supra note 139, at 446–48.
Vivatvaraphol, supra note 4, at 3340.
Id.
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 21 (emphasis added).
PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 139, at 435 (emphasis added).
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Hague Convention. Rather, it appears that based on the Hague
Convention‘s text, courts must take into account the varying contexts
in which the clause was included in the custody agreement when
determining whether a parent‘s ne exeat right constituted a right of
custody.
V. CONCLUSION
In Abbott v. Abbott, rather than framing the issue in a casespecific manner, the Court posed the underlying issue as whether ne
exeat rights constitute ―rights of custody‖ under the Hague
Convention.187 While the Court focused on creating a uniform and
consistent standard to apply in Hague Convention cases involving ne
exeat rights, it misconstrued the Convention‘s objectives and
ultimately rendered an overly broad decision that contradicts the text
of the treaty itself.188

187. See supra Part IV.A.
188. See supra Part IV.C.

